Article deals with the problem of the harmonisation and unifi cation of the family law in the European Union as the consequence of the building the single European Space. Th e main claim of the author is that a speedy unifi cation of substantive family law, particularly one that is decreed by European institutions, would lead to loss on national and regional legal culture, what accorfi ng the author can't be justifi ed. Th e alternative is a close cooperation of individual European cultural groups or neighboring countries and the unifi cation of the confl ict of laws provisions and of the law of jurisdiction of the courts as well as by enacting regulations on (mutual) recognition and enforcement of court decision.
I. Unifi cation of the substantive family law
In the European legal policy an all-embracing unifi cation in the fi eld of family law is oft entimes considered as desirable. On a comparative law basis a "Commission on European Familiy Law" (CEFL)", composed of numerous professors from all over Europe, is compiling the so called "Principles of European Family Law" (Principles) since 2001. In the fi elds "Divorce and Maintenance Between Former Spouses" 1 and "Parental Responsibilities" 2 these Princi-ples exist already, whereas the work on "Property Relations Between Spouses" 3 is still in progress.
More recently however the single Europeans nations and regions legal tradition is stressed as a value of its own. Th is paradigm shift is observable for example in comparative law that does not any longer mainly look for common ground but instead emphasizes what the individual legal systems distinguishes from each other. Plurality -and not equality or unifi cation -is now considered as an value of its own.
Others claim, that, in particular in the fi eld of family law, elements of an European legal culture do indeed exist and could be used as basis for an unification of law. One line of argument points to the canon law fundament of the European matrimonial law. However, at the best such a fundament would back the western part of Europe with the intellectual centre Rom, but that is, of course, not identical with entire Europe. Moreover, from this tradition only the principle of consent and the spouse's duty to mutual assistance have survived. Th e rest was washed away by numerous changes like the creation of far reaching possibilities to get divorced or the creation of same-sex marriages -not even to mention the alterations that took place concerning the purpose of marriage or the question by whom the marriage ceremony has to be performed.
In favour of the existence of a European legal culture another line of argument 4 points to the achievements during the last decades: Equal rights for men and women, reduction of discrimination against homosexual relationships that nowadays, too, have the possibility of entering into a relationship that is legally acknowledged, growing acceptance of extramartial cohabitation, reduction of discrimination of children born out of wedlock or the perception of children as legal persons rather than as mere objects of their parental custody. On the basis of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms these standards could be transposed in the legal system of the Member States by the European Court of Human Rights. In fact this is already taking place, however on a very diff erent range, depending on the respective national legal system. Moreover, working with these alleged basic principles of European legal culture would require in particular a very abstract perspective that not only ignores the various exceptions but also the fact that these principles may be understood diff erently in the various European regions. Also, in many parts the aforementioned Principles appear as a intersection of terms detached from the legal reality, that are connoted unequally in the various legal systems and that are conregarding Parental Responsibilities, Intersentia: Antwerp-Oxford, 2007. structed diff erently, depending on the respective legal system in its total and the particular legal culture. In some cases they are not even this, but elevate things to Principles that infl uential CECL members consider as being "modern". Th e contemporary way of comparison of law highlights this fi ndings prominently because it avoids to declare legal instruments from diff erent legal systems prematurely as identical without taking the diff erences into account that derive from the normative overall context or the way the law is applied. Especially in the fi eld of family law these diff erences are rather large.
Under the umbrella of an alleged "European legal culture" two cultural areas exist that are completely diff erent and separated for now 1000 years. With Turkey a country would join this circle that belongs to a third large cultural area. Th inking about a European unifi cation in the fi eld of family law would, therefore, makes it necessary to consider at least three diff erent levels of legal cultures: An alleged European Legal Culture, the diff erent legal-cultural areas in Europe (the West, the East, the Islamic Culture), national legal cultures and, as not all European states have a unifi ed family law, even regional legal cultures: For instance the Spanish regional laws (fueros) diff er sometimes quite strongly. However, this does not constitute an existential problem for Spain -a fi nding that is endorsed by the example of the USA with its 50 matrimonial laws that are partly based on completely diff erent principles.
Such a focus on regional and national legal cultures may be criticized as backward-looking and structural conservatism; it may also easily slip to antiEuropean resentments. But on the other side, this focus is maybe due to the respect we own the cultural plurality in Europe and the human desire to cultivate it. However, heterogeneousness of legal systems has no end in itself. Th erefore, there are no objections against a gradual integration of legal culture in the fi eld of family law. In this fi eld of law many European legal systems adopted already ideas from the neighbor states and, by this, lost their peculiarities. However, it makes a big diff erence if legal unity is growing step by step or if it is decreed panEuropean respectively orientated blindly on alleged pan-European "Principles".
Th e crucial questions therefore are: Which advantages would such a decreed unifi cation of law off er? And: Would it outbalance or at least counterbalance the loss of culture that would come along with it in comparison with a gradual multipolar integration? Th e advocates of a decreed unifi cation of law point to the benefi t of legal certainty for bi-and multinational families in a Europe characterized by a considerable mobility of its population. However, the special position of bi-and multinational families does not justify a radical unifi cation of family law in whole Europe. In average in the EC only 5 % of the inhabitants of a Member State are not a citizen of this state. Arguing with such exceptions is always dishonest or, at least, bears evidence of the inability to desist from the own belonging to a mobile European elite. In addition, legal certainty for bi-or multinational families can be achieved by other means.
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Th e abstract guarantee of maximal mobility throughout Europe is not a value on its own by whose realization any kind of thoughtfulness may be put aside. In truth the call for unifi cation of the substantive family law in Europe is oft en motivated by two factors: Firstly, the attempt to use the European level as a detour to implement "progressive" law that would not be capable of winning a majority in the single states. Th is blind "progressive thinking" is nothing less than a form of cultural imperialism.
5 Secondly the eff ort to postulate the primacy of a globally structured economic order by claiming that the diff erences in Europe do not derive from cultural disparities but from the social conditions that have to be equalized. Th is argument is not convincing. First of all Europe would be reduced to a mere economic area. Secondly, the diff erences in the social conditions are, of course, part of a nation's or region's culture. Th ey are even part of the legal culture as they are interdependent with the law in force.
However, the warning of a cultural loss by unifi cation of law voiced by a family law scientist from Germany that also works on history of law may sound particularly strange, as one may claim that especially in Germany multiple unifi cations of family law have taken place in the last 120 years. For instance one can point to the German Empire of 1871 and the coming into eff ect of the German Civil Code (BGB) on January 1 st , 1900: Th e confessional divided German Reich, in whose catholic south still canon matrimonial law that does not know the possibility of divorce was in force, and the protestant north, in particularly Prussia, adopted a unifi ed family law based on the Prussian-protestant model. Th e constitution of the German Empire did not transfer such a competence to the Federal Government. But a few years aft er the formation of the Reich this competence was created by an amendment of the constitution. Th e already in 1875 adopted "Law on Civil Status" 6 established the compulsory civil marriage throughout the German Reich. Th is was considered as a welcomed opportunity to fi nally get rid of the remnants of churchly infl uence in family law, a position that on the Bavarian level would never have been acceptable to a majority. As it turned out, this was also the fi rst step to a "cultural abolishment concept" that was decided on in some kind of national fl ush but that by and large and in the medium term proved its worth. However, this unifi cation of law procedure took place in a cultural area that was clued together by the togetherness in the Holy Roman Empire over the centuries, the same language and a very strong national spirit.
"Th e European citizen will seek European solutions" 7 -true, but maybe one should wait until European citizen indeed exist. And this won't happen if the European Commission tries to design the very same Europe that it considers as the "area of freedom" in a centralist manner without showing respect for the European cultural pluralism.
II. Legal harmonization
Hence, an assimilation of the substantive family law on EC level is not recommendable because the advantages that would go along with that for a minority would not outweigh the arising disadvantages for the majority. And other convincing reasons to act so do not exist. Even a transfer of competences to the EC -which would be necessary as luckily in the opinion of the majority of scholars and judges not even with the freedom of movement any kind of legislative power of the EC can be justifi ed -is fortunately not acceptable to the majority.
Th e question arising is therefore, by which other means legal certainty for biand multinational families can be achieved? Th e answer: Harmonization of law. When talking about harmonization one has to separate three diff erent issues: (1) Th e international jurisdiction of courts has to be unifi ed. (2) Th e criteria to decide which legal system is applicable in cases with a foreign element have to be standardized, too. So not the substantive family law but the confl icts of law provisions have to be unifi ed. (3) Last but not least it must be guaranteed that court decisions of a member state are recognized in all other member states as easily as possible and that they can be judicially enforced.
Th ese measures don't have to be restricted on the EC, that has the instrument of regulations to work with, but can also be fructifi ed for non EC member states by the means of international treaties.
International jurisdiction of courts a)
Th e international jurisdiction of courts was unifi ed by the Brussels-I-Regulation.
8 As a basic rule persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State, Art. 2-4 Brussels-IRegulation. Art. 5-7 Brussels-I-Regulation deal with special jurisdictions. Th ey are orientated on the substantive or procedural familiarity with the subject. b) As far as matrimonial law and the law of parents and child are concerned, the Brussels-I-Regulation is supplemented by the Brussels-IIa-Regulation 9 that governs the divorce itself and the ancillary matters explicitly mentioned in the Regulation, in particular parental custody. Th e originally for the Rom-III-Regulation 10 intended rules of jurisdiction and provision concerning agreements regulating the court jurisdiction did not come into force. Th e preparatory works for the intended Rom-V-Regulation that shall deal with matrimonial property regimes do also not aff ect these court jurisdictions.
Th e Brussels-IIa-Regulation is based on the principle of residence; this rejection of the former principle of nationality works as a model for other areas of legal harmonization. Art. 3 Brussels-IIa-Regulation stipulates that in matters relating to divorce jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of the Member State in whose territory
• the spouses are habitually resident, or • the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or • the respondent is habitually resident in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or • the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made, or • the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her 'domicile' there.
It is noticeable that this jurisdiction is of exclusive nature if a spouse is sued that has his habitually residence in the territory of a Member State, Art. 6 Brussels-IIa-Regulation. For decisions dealing with matters of parental responsibility over a child who is habitually resident in a member state the jurisdiction lies with the courts of that member state, Art. 8 Brussels-IIa-Regulation. Th e following articles stipulate special jurisdictions for cases involving child abduction or change of residence. • the court for the place where the defendant is habitually resident, or • the court for the place where the creditor is habitually resident, or • the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties, or • the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning parental responsibility if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties.
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Confl ict of law provisions
A unifi cation of the confl ict of law provisions would make certain that every European court has to decide a specifi c family law matter by applying the same substantive law. However, one has to be aware of the fact that this solution will provide less legal certainty compared with a unifi cation of the substantive family law, because harmonizing the confl ict of law provisions only does not guarantee that every court applies foreign law correctly. Beyond the question of legal certainty the unifi cation of the confl ict of law provision is the consistent advancement of the legal harmonization as it diminishes incentives for a "forum shopping" arising from the wide catalogue of jurisdictions particularly in divorce cases by the Brussels-IIa-Regulation.
Th e EC already enacted a couple of regulations harmonizing the Member States confl ict of law regulations, namely in the areas of maintenance obligations and divorce. Others areas shall follow. However, even on this level legal harmonization has to face some serious problems. Art. 3 of the 2007 Hague Protocol stipulates as general rule that maintenance obligations shall be governed by the law of the State of the habitual residence of the creditor. In the case of a change in the habitual residence of the creditor, the law applicable changes, too. Th erefore, the confl ict of law provisions, too, are based on the residence principle. Art. 4 of the 2007 Hague Protocol amends this rule for mutual maintenance obligations between parents and children: If the creditor is unable, by virtue of the law referred to in Article 3, to obtain maintenance from the debtor, the law of the forum shall apply, Art. 4 para. 2. If even by this the creditor is unable to obtain maintenance from the debtor, the law of the State of their common nationality, if there is one, shall apply, Art. 4 para. 4. Art. 5 of the 2007 Hague Protocol stipulates a special rule with respect to spouses and ex-spouses: In the case of a maintenance obligation between spouses or exspouses, Article 3 shall not apply if one of the parties objects and the law of another State, in particular the State of their last common habitual residence, has a closer connection with the marriage. In such a case the law of that other State shall apply. b) Th e Rom-III-Regulation stipulates which substantive divorce law is applicable. Th e preliminary question if in the fi eld of divorce law unifi ed confl ict of law provisions are really necessary for the functioning of the single European market and, connected with that, if the EC actually had the legislative competence, is answered in the affi rmative implicitly by the Rom-III-Regulation. However, looking on the US and its domestic market that functions despite 50 diff erent marriage laws the suspicion arises that the EC acted ultra vires.
Th e Rom-III-Regulation came into force on December 20, 2010 and shall apply from June 21, 2012 on, Art. 21. Th e regulation stipulates the law applicable involving a confl ict of laws to divorce and legal separation, Art. 1 para. 1. Th e Rom-III-Regulation applies universally. Th erefore the law declared applicable in the regulation applies even if it is not the law of a Member State, e.g. Norwegian law.
However, only 15 Members States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Rumania and Slovenia) take part at the so called "closer cooperation" within the EC, of which the Rom-III-Regulation is a part. Th erefore its scope of application is limited to these Member States. Even in the fi eld of divorce law it is still a long way to go for unifi ed European confl ict of law provisions. From a legal policy point of view, German scholars argue that it is doubtful if the sensitive international divorce law is the appropriate fi eld to test the instrument of "closer cooperation", even more as the Regulation with its far reaching choice of law possibilities, the change from the principle of nationality, which was so far the standard under German Law (Art. 17 para. 1 s. 1 Introductory Act to the German Civil Code, EGBGB), to the principle of residence and its extreme friendliness towards divorce (compare Art. 10 Rom-III-Regulation) is regarded as "modern, extensive and aggressive" 11 . From a traditional point of view the design of this confl ict of law provisions is indeed not strictly "neutral". Rather it should help to enforce particular aspects of substantive law on the level of confl ict of law provisions already: Th e facilitation of divorce to the greatest possible extent.
An economic domestic market alone doesn't create a federal order within whom one may point to the US as a prototype for a residence orientated approach, and for good reasons the question on party autonomy concerning the choice of the law applicable is not answered homogeneous in Europe.
Art. 5 Rom-III-Regulation allows the spouses to designate the law applicable to divorce and legal separation provided that it is one of the following laws:
• the law of the State where the spouses are habitually resident at the time the agreement is concluded, or • the law of the State where the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there at the time the agreement is concluded, or • the law of the State of nationality of either spouse at the time the agreement is concluded, or • the law of the forum.
If the spouses didn't designate the law applicable pursuant to Article 5, divorce and legal separation shall be subject to the law of the State:
• where the spouses are habitually resident at the time the court is seized; or, failing that, • where the spouses were last habitually resident, provided that the period of residence did not end more than one year before the court was seized, in so far as one of the spouses still resides in that State at the time the court is seized; or, failing that, • of which both spouses are nationals at the time the court is seized; or, failing that, where the court is seized.
c) As part of the Stockholm program the European Commission meanwhile also submitted proposals concerning martial property regimes (16.3.2011 (16.3. , COM (2011 , 126) and registered partnerships property regimes (16.3.2011 (16.3. COM (2011 . Th ese proposals aim on a unifi cation of the respective confl ict of law provisions within a universal applicable Rom-V-Regulation. Th e proposal on martial property regimes embodies far reaching possibilities for the choice of law during the marriage in being (Art. 16, 18) . In the absence of a choice of law martial property regimes shall be subject to the law of the State where the spouses were fi rstly habitually resident aft er marriage, or, failing that, of which both spouses are nationals at the time of marriage, or, failing that, of which the spouses considering all circumstances are closest linked with, Art. 17 of the proposal.
However, both proposals stipulate diff ering rules. Taking into account that in Europe the variety of regulations for legally framed partnerships is very broad, the classifi cation will not always be easy. In addition, if terms like marriage etc. are to be determined autonomously, the danger of up-or downgradings arises. Last but not least the preliminary question if the particular legal partnership is valid is likely to cause diffi culties, too.
However, the EC became victim of the scope of it's own proposal insofar as Member States that did not enact rules about civil partnerships or same-sex marriages off ered resistance against this proposal. Moreover, the British law does not know the martial property regime as it is commonplace e.g. in Germany, but off ers the instrument of "fi nancial relief " as consequence of a divorce. Th e tensions arising from these completely diff erent approaches are evident. For the time being, a success of these endeavors is, therefore, unlikely, even more as according to Art. 81 para. 2 TFEU an unanimous decision in the Council of the European Union would be necessary.
As the matrimonial property regime is connected to numerous other areas of law, the implementation of this proposal would cause multitudinous diffi cult classifi cation problems. In addition, problems about how to draw a line to other European regulations, including the intended regulation on the law of succession, would arise. However, that's of course no obstacle.
Recognition and enforcement
Finally a few words about recognition and enforcement of court decisions: On the basis of the Brussels-IIa-Regulation a judgment given in a Member State shall be recognized in the other Member States without any special procedure being required, Art. 21 para. 1. Th e following two articles stipulate some exceptions like e.g. if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought (ordre-public-reservation) or if due process of law was violated. A judgment on the exercise of parental responsibility in respect of a child given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State and has been served shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there, Art. 28 Brussels-IIa-Regulation. Th is may cause diffi cult problems in individual cases, for example in case of a "clean break" via paying a "lump sum" under British law: In which situations have divorce consequences to be qualifi ed as belonging to the area of maintenance obligations and in which as being governed by the matrimonial property regime? Th e answer to this question is important particularly as in the latter situation EC Regulation No 4/2009 is not applicable.
Th is has two consequences: A judgment given in a Member State has to be recognized by another Member State without any special procedure being required and without a chance to contest the validity of its recognition. A judgment given in a Member State which is enforceable in that Member State is enforceable in another Member State like a domestic judgment; a declaration of enforceability is no longer required. In addition to this one has to take into Th is mechanism will therefore be the new standard. It will promote the European legal harmonization in a way that makes sense, provided that the respective Member State has suffi cient safeguards to ensure a due process of law. However, to rely on that requires a considerable degree of trust.
Unifi cation of substantive law revisited
Opposing a overhastily Europe-wide unifi cation of substantive family law, this has to be pointed out explicitly, must not be put on the same level with the rejection of unifi cations of law on a regional scale in certain cultural areas or among neighbor states with a high degree of population exchange as a fi rst step of a gradual integration.
An example for this is an agreement between Germany and France creating an optional matrimonial property regime between these two countries. However, this agreement has yet to be ratifi ed. Although this matrimonial property regime is based on the structures of the German "matrimonial property regime "Zugewinngemeinschaft " [community of surplus]", it includes a number of alterations derived from French law. Due to that for German-French-couples this property regime is an interesting alternative to a "pure" German or French property regime. Th is special property regime will not only be open for German-French-couples, but for mere national marriages, too. Th e treaty is open for entry by other states. Who knows, maybe at the end of the development stands a central-European or even pan-Europe optional matrimonial property regime?
An example for a unifi cation of law in a specifi c cultural area that is characterized by a distinctive emotion of togetherness is, of course, the Nordic legal family, whose states work together tightly in legislative matters for almost 100 years. However, who praises this as a directly transferable model for a unifi cation of law in whole Europe is -I fear I am repeating myself -oblivious of the plurality of European legal culture. ICLR, 2012, Vol. 12, No. 2.
III. Conclusion: Harmonization yes, unifi cation no
Summing up: A speedy unifi cation of substantive family law, particularly one that is decreed by European institutions, would lead to loss on national and regional legal culture that can't be justifi ed. Possible however is a close cooperation of individual European cultural groups or neighboring countries. A unifi ed European family law has to grow slowly.
Th e needs of bi-and multinational families can be met by a unifi cation of the confl ict of laws provisions and of the law of jurisdiction of the court as well as by enacting regulations on (mutual) recognition and enforcement of court decision. On this a number of important steps have been taken on the EC level already within the last ten years. Neighboring countries of the EC should, if possible, be included in this development.
